The importance of usability and accessibility in the design of voting systems has become increasingly apparent. It is not sufficient that the internal operation of these systems be correct; in addition, voters and election officials must be able to use them effectively and efficiently.
There are some properties of voting systems that make good design especially difficult:
The challenge, then, is to provide a voting system that voters can use comfortably, efficiently, and with justified confidence that they have cast their votes correctly. The requirements within this section are intended to serve that goal. Three broad principles motivate this section:
Note that these principles refer to the entire voting process. The VVSG applies only to voting systems; other aspects of the process (such as administrative rules and procedures) are outside the scope of the VVSG, but are nonetheless crucial for the full achievement of the principles.
Several uncommon terms are used in this section. For the convenience of the reader, they are defined below. Many other technical terms frequently used throughout the VVSG are defined in Appendix A. Note in particular the distinctions among these terms: voting process, voting system, voting device, voting session, and voting station.
All the requirements in Section 3 have the purpose of improving the quality of interaction between voters and voting systems. Please note how Sections 3.2 and 3.3 work together:
The voting system should support a process that provides a high level of usability for all voters. The goal is for voters to be able to negotiate the process effectively, efficiently, and comfortably.
Many of the mandatory voting system standards in HAVA Section 301 [HAVA02] relate to the interaction between the voter and the voting system:
a. Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for federal office shall meet the following requirements:
1. In general.--
A. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall--
i. Permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;
ii. Provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and
iii. If the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office -
I. Notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot;
II. Notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and
III. Provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.
B. A state or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by -
i. Establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and
ii. Providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error).
C. The voting system shall ensure that any notification required under this paragraph preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.
The requirements of this section are intended to support these basic usability standards of HAVA.
Usability is defined generally as a measure of the effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction achieved by a specified set of users with a given product in the performance of specified tasks. In the context of voting, the primary user is the voter (although the equipment is used by poll workers as well), the product is the voting system, and the primary task is the correct recording of the votes (although other tasks are associated with poll workers as users, e.g. system setup).
Additional requirements for task performance are independence and privacy: the voter should normally be able to complete the voting task without assistance from others, and the votes should be private. Lack of independence or privacy may adversely affect effectiveness (e.g., by possibly inhibiting the voter's free choice) and efficiency (e.g., by slowing down the process).
General usability is covered by both high-level performance-based requirements (in this section) and design requirements (in following sections). Whereas the latter require the presence of specific features generally thought to promote usability, the former directly address metrics for effectiveness (e.g., correct capture of voter selections), efficiency (e.g., time taken to vote), and satisfaction. The voting system is tested by having groups of people (representing voters) attempt to perform various typical voting tasks. The requirement is met only if those tasks are accomplished with a specified degree of success.
The requirements of this section set benchmarks for the usability of the voting system as a whole. There are three performance requirements that deal with effectiveness and two reporting requirements, one for efficiency and one for satisfaction.The metrics are defined as follows:
Because of the statistical nature of the testing, numerical results must be interpreted very carefully. The numbers have meaning only within the context of the Voting Performance Protocol (VPP). Note especially that the tests associated with these requirements are designed as repeatable controlled experiments and not as “realistic” measures of voting behavior, as might be found in a wide variety of voting contexts. Please see [HFP07] for full details.
Preliminary research at the direction of the TGDC that included experimentation with a variety of voting systems has allowed the Human Factors Subcommittee of the TGDC to judge that the following benchmark values would allow better systems to pass the test, while preventing certification of poorer systems:
These tentative values may be adjusted based on planned research to be conducted with additional systems. The TGDC may also consider whether the benchmarks should be strengthened in anticipation of improvements in the design of future voting systems.
The system SHALL achieve a Total Completion Score of at least 98% as measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting System
Test Reference: Performance
The system SHALL achieve a Perfect Ballot Index of at least 2.33 as measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting System
Test Reference: Performance
The system SHALL achieve a voter inclusion index of at least 0.35 as measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting System
Test Reference: Performance
The test lab SHALL report the metrics for usability of the voting system, as measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting system
Source: New requirement
The test lab SHALL report all the effectiveness metrics for usability as defined and measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting system
Source: New requirement
The test lab SHALL report the Average Voting Session Time, as measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting system
DISCUSSION
This requirement encourages systems to enable voters to vote with reasonable speed. Note that this requirement does not apply to the audio interface of a system, or to the use of special input devices for voters with dexterity disabilities.
Source: New requirement
The test lab SHALL report the Average Voter Confidence, as measured by the VPP.
Applies To: Voting system
Source: New requirement
The manufacturer SHALL conduct summative usability tests on the voting system using individuals who are representative of the general population and SHALL report the test results, using the Common Industry Format, as part of the TDP.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
Voting system developers are required to conduct realistic usability tests on the final product before submitting the system to conformance testing. This is to encourage early detection and resolution of usability problems.
The usability of the voting process is enhanced by the presence of certain functional capabilities. These capabilities differ somewhat depending on whether or not the system presents an editable interface within which voters can easily change their votes (typically an electronic screen) or an interface in which voters must obtain a new ballot to make changes (typically a manually-marked paper ballot).
If the voter selects more than the allowable number of choices within a contest, the voting system SHALL notify the voter of the effect of this action before the ballot is cast and counted.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
In the case of manual systems, this may be achieved through appropriately placed instructions. This requirement has no force for VEBD systems, since they prevent overvoting in the first place.
The voting system SHALL allow the voter, at the voter’s choice, to submit an undervoted ballot without correction.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The voting system SHALL provide the voter the opportunity to correct the ballot for either an undervote or overvote before the ballot is cast and counted.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
In the case of manual systems, this may be achieved through appropriately placed written instructions. Some corrections may require the voter to obtain a new paper ballot from a poll worker. Also, note the requirements on precinct-count optical scanners in Section 3.2.2.2 below.
If and only if the voter successfully casts the ballot, then the system SHALL so notify the voter.
Applies To: DRE, PCOS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this requirement is to provide feedback to voters to assure them that the voting session has been completed. Note that either a false notification of success or a missing confirmation of actual success violates this requirement.
Voting systems such as DREs and EBMs present voters with an editable interface, allowing them to easily change their votes prior to final casting of the ballot.
The VEBD SHALL prevent voters from selecting more than the allowable number of choices for each contest.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement does not specify exactly how the system must respond when a voter attempts to select an "extra" candidate. For instance, the system may prevent the selection and issue a warning, or, in the case of a single-choice contest, simply change the vote.
The VEBD SHALL provide feedback to the voter, before final casting of the ballot that identifies specific contests for which the voter has selected fewer than the allowable number of choices (i.e., undervotes).
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For VEBD systems, no allowance is made for disabling this feature. Also, see requirement below on "Clarity of Warnings."
The VEBD SHALL provide the voter the opportunity to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted. This correction process SHALL NOT require external assistance. The corrections to be supported include modifying an undervote or overvote, and changing a vote from one candidate to another.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The VEBD SHALL allow the voter to change a vote within a contest before advancing to the next contest.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The point here is that voters using an editable interface should not have to wait for a final ballot review screen in order to change a vote.
The VEBD SHALL provide navigation controls that allow the voter to advance to the next contest or go back to the previous contest before completing a vote on the contest(s) currently being presented (whether visually or aurally).
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, voters should not be forced to proceed sequentially through all the contests before going back to check their votes within a previous contest.
If the voter takes the appropriate action to cast a ballot, but the system does not accept and record it successfully, including failure to store the ballot image, then the DRE SHALL so notify the voter and provide clear instruction as to the steps the voter should take to cast the ballot.
Applies To: DRE
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
If a DRE fails at the point of casting a ballot, it must clearly indicate to the voter and to election officials responding to the failure whether or not the ballot was cast. Otherwise, election officials may be unable to provide substantial confirmation that the vote was or was not counted, possibly resulting in disenfranchisement or the casting of two ballots by a single voter.
A device that "freezes" when the voter attempts to cast the ballot, providing no evidence one way or the other whether the ballot was cast, would violate this requirement.
Source: 2002 VSS I.2.4.3.3.k / VVSG'05 I.2.3.3.3.m
Non-Editable interfaces, such as manually-marked paper ballots (MMPB) do not have the same flexibility as do editable interfaces. Nonetheless, certain features are required, especially in the case of precinct-based optical scanners. Note that the technical definition of "marginal mark" may be found in Appendix A. Basically, a marginal mark is one that, according the manufacturer specifications, is neither clearly countable as a vote nor clearly countable as a non-vote.
The voting system SHALL be capable of providing feedback to the voter that identifies specific contests for which the voter has made more than the allowable number of votes (i.e.,. overvotes).
Applies To: PCOS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The voting system SHALL be capable of providing feedback to the voter that identifies specific contests for which the voter has made fewer than the allowable number of votes (i.e., undervotes). The system SHALL provide a means for an authorized election official to deactivate this capability entirely and by contest.
Applies To: PCOS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The voting system SHALL be capable of notifying the voter that he or she has submitted a paper ballot that is blank on one or both sides. The system SHALL provide a means for an authorized election official to deactivate this capability.
Applies To: PCOS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
One purpose of this feature is to detect situations in which the voter might be unaware that the ballot is two-sided. This feature is distinct from the ability to detect and warn about undervoting.
If the voting system has notified the voter that a potential error condition (such as an overvote, undervote, or blank ballot) exists, the system SHALL then allow the voter to correct the ballot or to submit it as is.
Applies To: PCOS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement mandates that the equipment be capable of allowing either correction or immediate submission. For instance, a questionable paper ballot might be physically ejected for possible correction. This requirement does not constrain the procedures that jurisdictions might adopt for handling such situations (e.g., whether poll worker intervention is required).
Paper-based precinct tabulators SHOULD be able to identify a ballot containing marginal marks. When such a ballot is detected, the tabulator SHALL:
Applies To: Precinct tabulator
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this requirement is to provide more certainty about the handling of poorly-marked ballots. If a given candidate or option is clearly marked as chosen, or left completely unmarked, then there is no ambiguity to resolve. However, each manufacturer should define a "gray zone" (with respect to location, darkness, etc.) in which marks will be actively flagged as ambiguous.
If the voter takes the appropriate action to cast a ballot, but the system does not accept and record it successfully, including failure to read the ballot or to transport it into the ballot box, the PCOS SHALL so notify the voter.
Applies To: PCOS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement means that PCOS systems must detect and report electrical and mechanical failures within the system itself. It does not require the detection of errors on the part of the voter. See also Requirement Part 1: 7.7.4-B.
The voting process must preclude anyone else from determining the content of a voter's ballot without the voter's cooperation. Privacy ensures that the voter can cast votes based solely on his or her own preferences without intimidation or inhibition.
The voting system SHALL prevent others from determining the contents of a ballot.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The voting system itself provides no means by which others can "determine" how one has voted. Of course voters could simply tell someone else for whom they voted, but the system provides no evidence for such statements, and therefore voters cannot be coerced into providing such evidence.
It is assumed that the system is deployed according to the installation instructions provided by the manufacturer. Whether the configuration of the voting system protects privacy may well depend on proper setup.
The ballot, any other visible record containing ballot information, and any input controls SHALL be visible only to the voter during the voting session and ballot submission.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement may involve different approaches for electronic and paper interfaces. In both cases, appropriate shielding of the voting station is important. When a paper record with ballot information needs to be transported by the voter, devices such as privacy sleeves may be necessary. This requirement applies to all records with information on votes (such as a vote verification record) even if that record is not itself a ballot.
During the voting session, the audio interface of the voting system SHALL be audible only to the voter.
Applies To: VEBD-A
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Voters who are hard of hearing but need to use an audio interface may also need to increase the volume of the audio. Such situations require headphones with low sound leakage.
The voting system SHALL issue all warnings in a way that preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
HAVA 301 (a)(1)(C) mandates that the voting system must notify the voter of an attempted overvote in a way that preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot. This requirement generalizes that mandate.
The voting system SHALL NOT issue a receipt to the voter that would provide proof to another of how the voter voted.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
When voters use non-typical ballot interfaces, such as large print or alternative languages, their anonymity may be vulnerable. To the extent possible, only the logical contents of their ballots should be recorded, not the special formats in which they were rendered. In the case of paper ballots, where the interface is the record, some format information is unavoidably preserved.
No information SHALL be kept within an electronic CVR that identifies any alternative language feature(s) used by a voter.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
No information SHALL be kept within an electronic CVR that identifies any accessibility feature(s) used by a voter.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The features specified in this section are intended to minimize cognitive difficulties for voters. They should always be able to operate the voting system and understand the effect of their actions.
The voting station SHALL provide instructions for all its valid operations.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
If an operation is available to the voter, it must be documented. Examples include how to change a vote, how to navigate among contests, how to cast a straight party vote, how to cast a write-in vote, and how to adjust display and audio characteristics.
The voting system SHALL provide a means for the voter to get help directly from the system at any time during the voting session.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The voter should always be able to get help from the system if needed. The purpose is to minimize the need for poll worker assistance. VEBD voting systems may provide this with a distinctive "help" button. Any type of voting system may provide written instructions that are separate from the ballot.
Instructional material for the voter SHALL conform to norms and best practices for plain language.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Although part of general usability, the use of plain language is also expected to assist voters with cognitive disabilities. The plain language requirements apply to instructions that are inherent to the voting system or that are generated by default. To the extent that instructions are determined by election officials designing the ballot, they are beyond of the scope of this requirement.
Warnings and alerts issued by the voting system SHOULD clearly state:
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For instance, “You have not interacted with the system for the past three minutes. Please press the ‘Need more time’ button right away to tell the system that you’re still here – Thank you.” rather than “System detects imminent timeout condition.” In case of an equipment failure, the only action available to the voter might be to get assistance from a poll worker.
When an instruction is based on a condition, the condition SHOULD be stated first, and then the action to be performed.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For instance, use "In order to change your vote, do X", rather than "Do X, in order to change your vote."
The system SHOULD use familiar, common words and avoid technical or specialized words that voters are not likely to understand.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For instance, "... there are more contests on the other side ..." rather than "...additional contests are presented on the reverse ..."
The system SHOULD start the visual presentation of each new instruction on a new line.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This implies not "burying" several unrelated instructions in a single long paragraph.
The system SHOULD issue instructions on the correct way to perform actions, rather than telling voters what not to do.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, “Fill in the oval for your write-in vote to count” rather than “If the oval is not marked, your write-in vote cannot be counted.”
The system's instructions SHOULD address the voter directly rather than use passive voice constructions.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, "remove and retain this ballot stub" rather than "this ballot stub must be removed and retained by the voter."
The system SHOULD avoid the use of gender-based pronouns.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, "...write in your choice directly on the ballot..." rather than "... write in his name directly on the ballot..."
Consistent with election law, the voting system SHALL support a process that does not introduce bias for or against any of the contest choices to be presented to the voter. In both visual and aural formats, the choices SHALL be presented in an equivalent manner.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
Certain differences in presentation are mandated by state law, such as the order in which candidates are listed and provisions for voting for write-in candidates. However, comparable characteristics such as font size or voice volume and speed must be the same for all choices.
The voting system SHALL provide the capability to design a ballot with a high level of clarity and comprehensibility.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The voting system SHOULD NOT visually present a single contest spread over two pages or two columns.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Such a visual separation poses the risk that the voter may perceive one contest as two, or fail to see additional choices. If a contest has a large number of candidates, it may be infeasible to observe this guideline.
The ballot SHALL clearly indicate the maximum number of candidates for which one can vote within a single contest.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The relationship between the name of a candidate and the mechanism used to vote for that candidate SHALL be consistent throughout the ballot.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, the response field where voters indicate their votes must not be located to the left of some candidates' names, and to the right of others'.
The system SHOULD display instructions near to where they are needed.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For instance, only general instructions should be grouped at the beginning of the ballot; those pertaining to specific situations should be presented where and when needed.
The use of color by the voting system SHOULD agree with common conventions: (a) green, blue or white is used for general information or as a normal status indicator; (b) amber or yellow is used to indicate warnings or a marginal status; (c) red is used to indicate error conditions or a problem requiring immediate attention.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
When an icon is used to convey information, indicate an action, or prompt a response, it SHALL be accompanied by a corresponding linguistic label.
Applies To: Voting device
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
While icons can be used for emphasis when communicating with the voter, they must not be the sole means by which information is conveyed, since there is no widely accepted "iconic" language and therefore not all voters may understand a given icon.
The requirements of this section are designed to minimize perceptual difficulties for the voter. Some of these requirements are designed to assist voters with poor reading vision. These are voters who might have some difficulty in reading normal text, but are not typically classified as having a visual disability and thus might not be inclined to use the Accessible Voting Station.
No voting system display screen SHALL flicker with a frequency between 2 Hz and 55 Hz.
Applies To: VEBD-V
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
Aside from usability concerns, this requirement protects voters with epilepsy.
Any aspect of the voting station that is adjustable by the voter or poll worker, including font size, color, contrast, audio volume, or rate of speech, SHALL automatically reset to a standard default value upon completion of that voter's session. For the Acc-VS, the aspects include synchronized audio/video mode and non-manual input mode.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This ensures that the voting station presents the same initial appearance to every voter.
If any aspect of a voting system is adjustable by the voter or poll worker, there SHALL be a mechanism to reset all such aspects to their default values.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The purpose is to allow a voter or poll worker who has adjusted the system into an undesirable state to reset all the aspects and begin again.
Voting systems SHALL provide a minimum font size of 3.0mm (measured as the height of a capital letter) for all text intended for voters or poll workers.
Applies To: Voting device
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
A voting station that uses an electronic image display SHALL be capable of showing all information in at least two font sizes, (a) 3.0-4.0 mm and (b) 6.3-9.0 mm, under control of the voter. The system SHALL allow the voter to adjust font size throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes.
Applies To: VEBD-V
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
While larger font sizes may assist most voters with poor vision, certain disabilities such as tunnel vision are best addressed by smaller font sizes. Larger font sizes may also assist voters with cognitive disabilities. This requirement mandates the availability of at least two font sizes, but additional choices (including continuous variability) are allowed.
Text intended for the voter SHOULD be presented in a sans serif font.
Applies To: Voting device
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Research has shown that users prefer such fonts.
Voting systems using paper ballots or paper verification records SHALL provide features that assist in the reading of such ballots and records by voters with poor reading vision.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
While this requirement may be satisfied by one of its sub-requirements, other innovative solutions are not precluded.
The system MAY achieve legibility of paper records by supporting the printing of those records in at least two font sizes, 3.0 - 4.0mm and 6.3 - 9.0mm.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Although the system may be capable of printing in several font sizes, the use of various font sizes in an actual election may be governed by local or state laws and regulations.
The system MAY achieve legibility of paper records by supporting magnification of those records. This magnification MAY be done by optical or electronic devices. The manufacturer MAY either: 1) provide the magnifier itself as part of the system, or 2) provide the make and model number of readily available magnifiers that are compatible with the system.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
The magnifier(s) either provided or cited must, of course, provide legibility for the paper as actually presented on the system. For instance, if the paper record is under a transparent cover to prevent the voter from touching it, the means of magnification must be compatible with this configuration.
The minimum figure-to-ground ambient contrast ratio for all text and informational graphics (including icons) intended for voters or poll workers SHALL be 3:1.
Applies To: Voting device
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
The voting station SHALL be capable of showing all information in high contrast either by default or under the control of the voter. The system SHALL allow the voter to adjust contrast throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes. High contrast is a figure-to-ground ambient contrast ratio for text and informational graphics of at least 6:1.
Applies To: VEBD-V
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
The default color coding SHALL support correct perception by voters with color blindness.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
There are many types of color blindness and no color coding can, by itself, guarantee correct perception for everyone. However, designers should take into account such factors as: red-green color blindness is the most common form; high luminosity contrast will help colorblind voters to recognize visual features; and color-coded graphics can also use shape to improve the ability to distinguish certain features.
Color coding SHALL NOT be used as the sole means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
While color can be used for emphasis, some other non-color mode must also be used to convey the information, such as a shape or text style. For example, red can be enclosed in an octagon shape.
The requirements of this section are designed to minimize interaction difficulties for the voter.
Voting systems SHALL NOT require page scrolling by the voter.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
That is, the page of displayed information must fit completely within the physical screen presenting it. Scrolling is not an intuitive operation for those unfamiliar with the use of computers. Even those experienced with computers often do not notice a scroll bar and miss information at the bottom of the "page." Voting systems may require voters to move to the next or previous "page."
The voting system SHALL provide unambiguous feedback regarding the voter’s selection, such as displaying a checkmark beside the selected option or conspicuously changing its appearance.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
Input mechanisms SHALL be designed to minimize accidental activation.
Applies To: Voting device
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
There are at least two kinds of accidental activation. One is when a control is activated as it is being “explored” by the voter because the control is overly sensitive to the touch. A second issue is the problem of having a control in a location where it can easily be activated unintentionally. An example would be a button in the very bottom left corner of the screen where a voter might hold the unit for support.
On touch screens, the sensitive touch areas SHALL have a minimum height of 0.5 inches and minimum width of 0.7 inches. The vertical distance between the centers of adjacent areas SHALL be at least 0.6 inches, and the horizontal distance at least 0.8 inches.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
No key or control on a voting system SHALL have a repetitive effect as a result of being held in its active position.
Applies To: Voting device
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This is to preclude accidental activation. For instance, if a voter is typing in the name of a write-in candidate, depressing and holding the "e" key results in only a single "e" added to the name.
These requirements address how long the system and voter wait for each other to interact. This section uses the following terms (also defined in Appendix A: Definitions of Words with Special Meanings):
The initial system response time of the voting system SHALL be no greater than 0.5 seconds.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This is so the voter can very quickly perceive that an action has been detected by the system and is being processed. The voter never gets the sense of dealing with an unresponsive or "dead" system. Note that this requirement applies to VEBD-A (audio) as well as to VEBD-V (visual) systems.
When the voter performs an action to record a single vote, the completed system response time of the voting system SHALL be no greater than one second in the case of a visual response, and no greater than five seconds in the case of an audio response.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, if the voter touches a button to indicate a vote for a candidate, a visual system might display an "X" next to the candidate's name, and an audio system might announce, "You have voted for Smith for Governor".
The completed system response time of the voting system for visual operations SHALL be no greater than 10 seconds.
Applies To: VEBD-V
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Even for "large" operations such as initializing the ballot or painting a new screen, the system must never take more than 10 seconds. In the case of audio systems, no upper limit is specified, since certain operations may take longer, depending on the length of the text being read (e.g., reading out a long list of candidates running in a contest).
If the system has not completed its visual response within one second, it SHALL present to the voter, within 0.5 seconds of the voter's action, some indication that it is preparing its response.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For instance, the system might present an hourglass icon indicating that it is "busy" processing the voter's request. This requirement is intended to preclude the "frozen screen" effect, in which no detectible activity is taking place for several seconds. There need not be a specific "activity" icon, as long as some visual change is apparent (such as progressively "painting" a new screen).
The voting system SHALL detect and warn about lengthy voter inactivity during a voting session. Each system SHALL have a defined and documented voter inactivity time, and that time SHALL be between two and five minutes.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Each type of system must have a given inactivity time that is consistent among and within all voting sessions. This ensures that all voters are treated equitably.
Upon expiration of the voter inactivity time, the voting system SHALL issue an alert and provide a means by which the voter may receive additional time. The alert time SHALL be between 20 and 45 seconds. If the voter does not respond to the alert within the alert time, the system SHALL go into an inactive state requiring poll worker intervention.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
HAVA Section 301 (a)(4) states that the voting system shall provide alternative language accessibility pursuant to the requirements of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a). Ideally every voter would be able to vote independently and privately, regardless of language. As a practical matter, alternative language access is mandated under the Voting Rights Act of 1975, subject to certain thresholds (e.g., if the language group exceeds 5% of the voting age population). Thus, election officials must ensure that the voting system they deploy is capable of handling the languages meeting the legal threshold within their districts.
While the following requirements support this process, it should be noted that they are requirements only for voting systems to be certified. It is anticipated that jurisdictions will apply additional requirements appropriate for their particular circumstances for procurement and deployment.
The voting system SHALL be capable of presenting the ballot, contest choices, review screens, vote verification records, and voting instructions in any language declared by the manufacturer to be supported by the system.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, if the manufacturer claims that a given system is capable of supporting Spanish and Chinese, then it must do so.
The system SHALL allow the voter to select among the available languages throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes.
Applies To: VEBD
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For instance, a voter may initially choose an English version of the ballot, but then wish to switch to another language in order to read a referendum question.
Information presented to the voter in the typical case of English-literate voters (including instructions, warnings, messages, contest choices, and vote verification information) SHALL also be presented when an alternative language is being used, whether the language is written or spoken.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Therefore, it may not be sufficient simply to present the ballot per se in the alternative language, especially in the case of VEBD systems. All the supporting information must also be available in the alternative language.
Any records, including paper ballots and paper verification records, SHALL have sufficient information to support auditing by poll workers and others who can read only English.SHALL
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Even though the system must be easily available to voters without a command of English, any persistent records of the vote must also be fully available to English-only readers for auditing purposes. In the case of paper, this does not imply a fully bi-lingual ballot. For instance, the full text of a referendum question might appear only in the alternative language, but the content of the vote (e.g., “yes” on ballot question 106) needs to be readable by English-only readers.
The manufacturer SHALL conduct summative usability tests for each of the system's supported languages, using subjects who are fluent in those languages but not fluent in English and SHALL report the test results, using the Common Industry Format, as part of the TDP.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
Voting systems are used not only by voters to record their votes, but also by poll workers who are responsible for set-up, operation while polls are open, light maintenance, and poll closing. Because of the wide variety of implementations, it is impossible to specify detailed design requirements for these functions. The requirements below describe general capabilities that all systems must support. Also, note that Maintainability of the voting system is covered in Part 1: 6.4.5 “Maintainability”.
Messages generated by the system for poll workers in support of the operation, maintenance, or safety of the system SHALL adhere to the requirements for clarity in Part 1: 3.2.4 “Cognitive issues”.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
Poll workers are responsible for opening polls, keeping the polls open and running smoothly during voting hours, and closing the polls afterwards. Operations may be categorized in three phases:
Setup includes all the steps necessary to take the system from its state as normally delivered to the polling place, to the state in which it is ready to record votes. It does not include ballot definition.
Polling includes such functions as:
Shutdown includes all the steps necessary to take the system from the state in which it is ready to record votes to its normal completed state in which it has captured all the votes cast and the voting information cannot be further altered.
The procedures for system setup, polling, and shutdown, as documented by the manufacturer, SHALL be reasonably easy for the typical poll worker to learn, understand, and perform.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement covers procedures and operations for those aspects of system operation normally performed by poll workers and other "non-expert" operators. It does not address inherently complex operations such as ballot definition or system repair. While a certain amount of complexity is unavoidable, these "normal" procedures should not require any special expertise. The procedures may require a reasonable amount of training.
The manufacturer SHALL conduct summative usability tests on the voting system using individuals who are representative of the general population and SHALL report the test results, using the Common Industry Format, as part of the TDP. The tasks to be covered in the test SHALL include setup, operation, and shutdown.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
The system SHALL include clear, complete, and detailed instructions and messages for setup, polling, and shutdown.
Applies To: Voting system
DISCUSSION
This requirement covers documentation for those aspects of system operation normally performed by poll workers and other "non-expert" operators. It does not address inherently complex operations such as ballot definition. The instructions would usually be in the form of a written manual, but could also be presented on other media, such as a DVD or videotape. In the context of this requirement, "message" means information delivered by the system to the poll worker as he or she attempts to perform a setup, polling, or shutdown operation.
Source: New requirement
The documentation required for normal system operation SHALL be presented at a level appropriate for non-expert poll workers.
Applies To: Voting system
DISCUSSION
For instance, the documentation should not presuppose familiarity with personal computers.
Source: New requirement
The documentation SHALL be in a format suitable for practical use in the polling place.
Applies To: Voting system
DISCUSSION
For instance, a single large reference manual that simply presents details of all possible operations would be difficult to use, unless accompanied by aids such as a simple "how-to" guide.
Source: New requirement
The instructions and messages SHALL enable the poll worker to verify that the system
Applies To: Voting system
DISCUSSION
The poll worker should not have to guess whether an operation has been performed correctly. The documentation should make it clear what the system "looks like" when correctly configured.
Source: New requirement
All voting systems and their components must be designed so as to eliminate hazards to personnel or to the equipment itself. Hazards include, but are not limited to:
Equipment associated with the voting system SHALL be certified in accordance with the requirements of UL 60950-1, Information Technology Equipment – Safety – Part 1 [UL05] by a certification organization accredited by the Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory program. The certification organization’s scope of accreditation SHALL include UL 60950-1.
Applies To: Voting system
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
UL 60950 is a comprehensive standard for IT equipment and addresses all the hazards discussed above under Safety.
HAVA Section 301 (a) (3) [HAVA02] reads, in part:
ACCESSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.--The voting system shall--
(A) be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters;
(B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one direct recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place;
The voting process is to be accessible to voters with disabilities through the use of a specially equipped voting station. A machine so equipped is referred to herein as an Accessible Voting Station (Acc-VS).
The requirements in this section are intended to address this HAVA mandate. Ideally, every voter would be able to vote independently and privately. As a practical matter, there may be some number of voters who, because of the nature of their disabilities, will need personal assistance with any system. Nonetheless, these requirements are meant to make the voting system independently accessible to as many voters as possible.
This section is organized according to the type of disability being addressed. For each type, certain appropriate design features are specified. Note, however, that a feature intended primarily to address one kind of disability may very well assist voters with other kinds.
There are many other requirements that apply to the Acc-VS besides those in this section. Please see Part 1: 3.1.3 “Interaction of usability and accessibility requirements” for a full explanation.
The requirements of this section are relevant to a wide variety of disabilities.
The Acc-VS SHALL be integrated into the manufacturer’s complete voting system so as to support accessibility for disabled voters throughout the voting session.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement ensures accessibility to the voter throughout the entire session. Not only must individual system components (such as ballot markers, paper records, and optical scanners) be accessible, but also they must work together to support this result.
The manufacturer SHALL supply documentation describing 1) recommended procedures that fully implement accessibility for voters with disabilities and 2) how the Acc-VS supports those procedures.
Applies To: Acc-VS
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this requirement is for the manufacturer not simply to deliver system components, but also to describe the accessibility scenarios they are intended to support.
When the provision of accessibility involves an alternative format for ballot presentation, then all information presented to non-disabled voters, including instructions, warnings, error and other messages, and contest choices, SHALL be presented in that alternative format.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
The support provided to voters with disabilities SHALL be intrinsic to the Accessible Voting Station. It SHALL NOT be necessary for the Accessible Voting Station to be connected to any personal assistive device of the voter in order for the voter to operate it correctly.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This requirement does not preclude the Accessible Voting Station from providing interfaces to assistive technology. (See definition of "personal assistive devices" in Appendix A..) Its purpose is to assure that disabled voters are not required to bring special devices with them in order to vote successfully. The requirement does not assert that the Accessible Voting Station will eliminate the need for a voter’s ordinary non-interfacing devices, such as eyeglasses or canes.
If a voting system provides for voter identification or authentication by using biometric measures that require a voter to possess particular biological characteristics, then the system SHALL provide a secondary means that does not depend on those characteristics.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
For example, if fingerprints are used for voter identification, another mechanism must be provided for voters without usable fingerprints.
If the Acc-VS generates a paper record (or some other durable, human-readable record) for the purpose of allowing voters to verify their votes, then the system SHALL provide a means to ensure that the verification record is accessible to all voters with disabilities, as identified in Part 1: 3.3 “Accessibility requirements”.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
While paper records generally provide a simple and effective means for technology-independent vote verification, their use can present difficulties for voters with certain types of disabilities. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that all voters have a similar opportunity for vote verification. Note that this requirement addresses the special difficulties that may arise with the use of paper. Verification is part of the voting process, and all the other general requirements apply to verification, in particular those dealing with dexterity (e.g. 3.3.4-C “Ballot Submission and Vote Verification”), blindness (e.g. 3.3.3-E “Ballot Submission and Vote Verification”), and poor vision issues (e.g. 3.2.5-G “Legibility of Paper Ballots and Verification Records”).
If the Acc-VS generates a paper record (or some other durable, human-readable record) for the purpose of allowing voters to verify their votes, then the system SHALL provide a mechanism that can read that record and generate an audio representation of its contents.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Sighted voters can directly verify the contents of a paper record. The purpose of this requirement is to allow voters with visual disabilities to verify, even if indirectly, the contents of the record. It is recognized that the verification depends on the integrity of the mechanism that reads the record to the voter. The audio must be generated via the paper record and therefore not depend on any electronic or other "internal" record of the ballot. Note that the paper record and its audio representation may be rendered in an alternative language. See also Requirements Part 1: 4.2.4-A, B.
These requirements specify the features of the accessible voting station designed to assist voters with low vision.
Low (or partial) vision includes dimness of vision, haziness, film over the eye, foggy vision, extreme near-sightedness or far-sightedness, distortion of vision, color distortion or blindness, visual field defects, spots before the eyes, tunnel vision, lack of peripheral vision, abnormal sensitivity to light or glare and night blindness. For the purposes of this discussion low vision is defined as having a visual acuity worse than 20/70.
People with tunnel vision can see only a small part of the ballot at one time. For these users it is helpful to have letters at the lower end of the font size range in order to allow them to see more letters at the same time. Thus, there is a need to provide font sizes at both ends of the range.
People with low vision or color blindness benefit from high contrast and from a selection of color combinations appropriate for their needs. Between 7% and 10% of all men have color vision deficiencies. Certain color combinations in particular cause problems. Therefore, use of color combinations with good contrast is required. Note also the general Requirement Part 1: 3.2.5-J.
However, some users are very sensitive to very bright displays and cannot use them for long. An overly bright background causes a visual white-out that makes these users unable to distinguish individual letters. Thus, use of non-saturated color options is an advantage for some people.
It is important to note that some of the requirements in Part 1: 3.2.5 “Perceptual issues” also provide support for voters with certain kinds of vision problems.
The manufacturer SHALL conduct summative usability tests on the voting system using individuals with low vision and SHALL report the test results, using the Common Industry Format, as part of the TDP.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
An Accessible Voting Station with a color electronic image display SHALL allow the voter to adjust the color saturation throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes. At least two options SHALL be available: a high and a low saturation presentation.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
It is not required that the station offer a continuous range of color saturation. "High saturation" refers to bright, vibrant colors. "Low saturation" refers to muted (or grayish) colors.
Buttons and controls on Accessible Voting Stations SHALL be distinguishable by both shape and color. This applies to buttons and controls implemented either "on-screen" or in hardware. This requirement does not apply to sizeable groups of keys, such as a conventional 4x3 telephone keypad or a full alphabetic keyboard.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
DISCUSSION
The redundant cues assist those with low vision. They also help individuals who may have difficulty reading the text on the screen.
The voting station SHALL provide synchronized audio output to convey the same information as that which is displayed on the screen. There SHALL be a means by which the voter can disable either the audio or the video output, resulting in a video-only or audio-only presentation, respectively. The system SHALL allow the voter to switch among the three modes (synchronized audio/video, video-only, or audio-only) throughout the voting session while preserving the current votes.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
This feature may also assist voters with cognitive disabilities.
These requirements specify the features of the Accessible Voting Station designed to assist voters who are blind.
The manufacturer SHALL conduct summative usability tests on the voting system using individuals who are blind and SHALL report the test results, using the Common Industry Format, as part of the TDP.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.1 “Inspection”
The Accessible Voting Station SHALL provide an Audio-Tactile Interface (ATI) that supports the full functionality of the visual ballot interface, as specified in Part 1: 6.2 “Voting Variations”.
Applies To: Acc-VS
Test Reference: Part 3: 3.2 “Functional Testing”
DISCUSSION
Note the necessity of both audio output and tactilely discernible controls for voter input. Full functionality includes at least: